Saving football, this time for real. Part 1

Athletic Bilbao, punishing a good club

Athletic Bilbao, a club that depends almost entirely on breeding its own squad through the academy and regional grassroots academies is one of only three clubs in Spain that had never relegated from the first division, doesn’t spend beyond its means, and possibly the club with the strongest connections to its community. A club that counts in its rise and fall on its sporting project, developing players, having sound management at the top. A model that demonstrates more football fair play by practice than anything the ties and sunglasses will decorate via their random Football Fair play regulations.

Now if we talk about distributing the football wealth on clubs based on earning it through their performances as proper football clubs, the way football clubs are supposed to be run, how much that brilliant football model Athletic follows is recognized in football wealth distribution?

Zero.

Athletic Bilbao can spend five years to build a proper cycle with a competitive team to get oppressed out of any European spot (where you can get more money) by a club or two making some random fully baked signings with the hope to recover the transfers investments via the European competitions additional revenues. And, Hey, Athletic, back to square one.

Why will clubs not prioritize turning squad building to suicidal surgical transfer auctions instead of organic consistent growth then?  

Why is everyone surprised that all clubs (big, small, all) are acting like hyenas fighting for a piece of that cash to waste via over-inflated spending (all spending is inflated in nowadays world football)?

Why will clubs have patience with managers and young players they believe they may deliver on the long term if the future is totally dictated by short-termism?

How is it a surprise that all football clubs are riding that economic destructive rollercoaster created by that vicious circle where the amount of money you get can change by every year dramatically depending on your team getting one point more or less in a season, which depends on whether you had better luck (more often than not, spent more) in the previous summer transfer auction?

Football regulations decide where the money goes and how it is distributed and that sets the tone for the whole dynamics of the game. The current model at its core is destructive. It creates a game dominated by owners’ greed, agents’ antiques, and players’ uncontrollable demands. 

When the concept is flawed and destructive, the discussions about who should get what and how much on its bases are debating which symphony the orchestra should play on the Titanic after striking the iceberg.

The idea that giving more money to “smaller” clubs just by default makes them more capable of competing for titles is a long-lasting laughable joke. In theory, it makes no sense. In practice, it proved to be counterproductive. It decreased the clubs’ dependence on developing players with the illusion that with more money they can compete in the market. That led to fewer developed players, supply declined while demand increased and so as the money. What a brilliant setup!

Here is what happened in reality (bare the exceptions that happened in football from the beginning of time): The bigger the club is the more money it will still have and the more attractive it is. In that sense, there are different classes of clubs and different classes of players. With the increase of money (the way it is now) clubs within the same class will just spend more on their equivalent class of players than they did before. And it goes all the way down. The disruptive factor for that statico is the owners. Some clubs got wealthy owners who invested in their clubs (regardless of how and why) and upgraded their clubs’ status. Other owners just took the money given to their clubs and relegated that status.

The current model of money distribution does nothing but harm to football no matter how the money is distributed on its basis.

There is a need to scratch the whole football economic model off and go back to the drawing board to find proper answers to:

1) Creating a model that provides more revenue channels (from the football accumulated wealth) than what league you play in and what your club achieved in one year.

2) Create a model where clubs actually earn the most of the money they get. But a model that provides fair chances for different clubs on different levels to create their business models that allow them to grow steadily towards whatever goals they aspire to.

3) Create a model that by its nature controls the market inflation and reshape the impact of the transfer market from being The factor in success to become a factor in it among many other factors including developing players.

4) Create a model that by its nature scare away owners with one objective in mind and that is to take most of the money out of the football cycle to their own pockets. 

5) Create a model that protects clubs from the economic fragility caused by the many unpredicted future crises involving ownership behavior, global economic crisis, etc…

A new model to fulfill the set goals

Reward the industry, not just the merchants.

     

1) Competitions rewarding system

     Now that the highest noise comes from the distribution of the UCL money, it is good to take that competition as a case study of a model that could trickle all the way down to the lowest division league in the least recognized football nation. Currently, the rewarding system is based on short-term results, driving the clubs crazy for transfers with immediate impact, inflating the market, wages, agent fees, and ultimately disrupting the football economy altogether.

That is the first to change by adding more diversity to the rewarding module combining short-term success with long-term work of developing players, the heart of the game.

Distribution channels

a)    Channel 1, Results-based rewarding: this is basically the model that exists right now. Clubs’ rewards are dependent on their performances throughout the season. 

     Sum (A) from all the money allocated to distribute between clubs will be shared based on their performance in the UCL. There is no need to go into a lot of explanation there as it is a known format that could be tweaked and agreed on per clubs’ discussions.

b)    Channel 2, football development-based rewarding: Sum (B) from the money allocated to distribute between clubs will be distributed based on each club’s success in developing football players. And this is how it works:

• ·       Split Sum (B) rewarding percentage on the different stages of the UCL (I will take the existing UCL structure here): Qualifying rounds, Play-off round, Group stages reward, Round 16, Quarter finals, Semi Finals, Final
• ·       Decide the minimum number of minutes club’s developed players (CDP) should collectively play in each round to be qualified to receive money from each stage the club reaches. CDP means the players developed through the club’s academies. In the group stage, we only calculate the CDP minutes played by each club in its first 5 games in the group stages (many clubs guarantee their qualification before the last game, so they may collect CDP minutes in an irrelevant game which misses the purpose and make the concept flawed).

Application sample:

After playing all the group stage games in the UCL, clubs get their rewards from Channel 1 based on their performances as it happens right now. As for rewarding the clubs from Channel 2, we create the CDP table listing the teams from the club with the highest CDP to the lowest *:

*In the rewards column the percentages are obviously random to explain the point.

Let’s assume a club like Ajax did not qualify from the group stages to the knockout, but it ended up being Team 1 in that table. Instead of being punished for their effort in developing players and giving all the money to Big transfers clubs that qualified, this channel rewards Ajax for their work that is the essence of football survival: developing players. As in the sample table, Teams 14, 15, and 16 failed to reach the CDPM (minimum of minutes played by academy players), so they get no rewards, and the sum of the money allocated to their slots in the table end up being redistributed on the other 13 teams in the table. Another example, if one of the two teams reaching the final fails to reach the CDPM, the other club gets the rewards of both slots. IF both teams fail to meet the CDPM the rewards allocated for that stage get redistributed on the teams of the previous round (semifinals) meeting the CDPM. If Team 4 and Team 5 ends up having the same CDP, the money sum of the two slots gets distributed equally between the two teams.

Thanks to restructuring the rewarding system this way, developing players become a way to achieve sustainable income for clubs. A club like Ajax will be able to hold to its players better, predict the revenues for few years in advance and plan accordingly, and balance up the rewards given to big clubs with big transfer pockets with the sustainable academy-based models that work harder under unpredictable risks as no one knows what youth will actually become a good player.

This will flatten the revenues rollercoaster from year to year which makes it possible to plan middle to long term. If you have 12 academy players this season, you can expect to have 10 of them for the next season and possibly add one or two and keep a relatively stable CDP position to secure consistent rewards, balancing that with being competitive to get the best slice possible from the channel 1 rewarding system.

A 10 years plan where the money distributed through channel 2 gradually increase while the money distributing through channel 1 decreasing can contribute in fixing a lot of football’s major problems:

• -          If at some point the money distributed through Channel 2 exceeds the money distributed through channel one, building a team dependent on club academy players become an economic must. That will force owners - following the money - to invest in their clubs’ academies.
• -          With Channel 2 pumping money in the veins of academies-based clubs, such clubs will be less dependent on selling players, making it even more difficult for rich clubs to just buy the best players around so the big club remains big, and the rest just feed it.
• -          With more clubs putting more effort on their academies the pool of developed players gets bigger and bigger with more players for different levels. That increase in supply can slow down market inflation and add more quality to teams in different divisions of different leagues.

 2) Players’ gratitude payments

During the revolution that followed the Super League circus, players voiced their rage and stood shoulder to shoulder to defend the spirit of the game and the right of smaller clubs to have a fair path to grow. Great. Now we should expect every player to put the money where your mouth is.

Play and pay.

Same as rewarding clubs based on short term success (the previous point) is not sustainable as it pumps random amounts of money that can change vastly from one season to another, rewarding a club that developed a player a percentage of any transfer the player makes in future is not sustainable either. 

The same as we try to reward players developing clubs consistently through the competitions rewarding system such clubs should have a consistent income from players they developed. Let's take an example, C.Ronaldo. Had there been a regulation that a player should pay 10% of his total annual income (that exceeds 1 M a year) to his developing club, that would’ve still made C.Ronaldo a rich man but also brought Sporting a consistent payment for 20 years now. 

What matters here is not how big that number is (and in this case, it is decent, to say the least) but the fact that Sporting could’ve been able to predict how much this talent will generate for the club in the 10 years following his departure to Manchester United.

The shared idea between rewarding clubs in competition for developing players and Player’s gratitude payment is securing consistent, relatively easy to predict income for clubs to help them to plan beyond the one-year-at-a-time period that governs modern football. This will only increase the value of having youth academies. The more the big clubs pay their imported players, the more the clubs lower on that food chain get consistently, the more they can invest in their academies and get more money to trigger that sustainable growth to reach the top.

 3) Controlling the transfer market:

Heading straight to the point here, there is a need to put a leash on the transfer market dynamics that is turning football to a suicidal greedy bidding war instead of what it should actually be: Clubs getting players for specific positions they need, clubs selling players they do not need, players moving clubs to improve their careers and financial benefits – within the boundaries of commonsense. 

There is a need for a structure that creates proper checks and balances to protect the game from its current circus.

•     The minimum duration for a player contract is five years for a player aged 24 or younger, and three years for a player older than 24.
  
  
•    The maximum transfer fee for a player is (His salary*number of years left in his contract* a fixed variable to be determined through further analysis). That’s where the FFP regulations regarding salary control become more powerful and make more sense as it compliments this structure. But a tweak there will also be good and that is to put a cap on how much the difference could be between the highest earner in the squad and the lowest earner. That will balance things up and make the clubs less pressured to splash all the cash on star players. A player who earns 30M today will not retire and seek a career as a carpenter if such new regulations make it impossible for any club to offer him more than 15 M. So, why not going for it?
  
  
•     The maximum commissions clubs (buying clubs) pay for transfer agents is a fixed percentage applied on the agreed transfer fee.
  
  
•     There is a maximum fixed percentage an agent can charge a player annually from the player’s football salary and rewards.

Let’s apply that to a player who is 23 years old with a salary of 10 million on a 5 years contract. If we assume the fixed transfer variable is 2.5, the player’s maximum transfer fee one year after signing his contract is 100 M, one year later it becomes 75 M, then 50M, then 25M in his final year. At any point, his club can improve his salary by offering a new contract which will reshape his transfer value.

This will keep the transfer market working without inflating it madly. Put that with the previously set rewarding systems and any ambitious club can start building a proper academy, improve its financing, and reach a point where it can also compete in the transfer market.

4) Controlling the money leaking

Regulators on national and continental bases (like parliaments) may need to step in at this point putting new laws differentiating sports clubs from the normal business companies to make it possible to protect the game without breaching business laws leading to legal cases.

Accordingly, there should be a maximum percentage of clubs’ net income that owners can take out of the club annually so we make sure the most of the money generated through football remains in the sport. That alone can make investors who only care for cashing money out of the clubs’ blood retreat and find themselves other investments away from the game. Open a hairdresser or something, who cares, just stay away.

 5) An obligatory reserve

In short, it is a tempting idea to discuss whether each club should have an obligatory reserve account and move a small percentage of its annual income there till the account sum matches the operation cost of running the club for three years. The club can’t use that reserve beyond very specific conditions. This is a financial guarantee against any future financial crises. A three years soft landing is enough to restructure the club to counter the urgent situation and adapt to it.

We want any club to have a chance to win titles, become a dominant club, and aspire to greatness. All the attempts to make leagues more competitive in the past 20 years ended up being just noise. EPL was the jewel of the crown with TV distributions, and we are still with the same clubs, plus one funded by a Russian Oligarch and one funded by a Petro-state. Yea, Leicester. I knew you were going to go there. We had similar phenomena before all the holy changes. Heck, the UCL was won once by Red Star Belgrade. Aberdeen? Deportivo in Spain? Verona in Italy? Besides, if Leicester's achievement was exceptional, well, that’s exactly the point. Exceptions.

Pumping more money randomly in clubs on short-term results-based success serves no purpose other than inflating the market and making football agents richer.  Let the clubs actually earn it instead of the exhausting rambles about All-clubs-Matter. A club that wins, gets rewarded. A club that contributes in developing talents gets rewarded. A club that does neither this nor that shouldn’t.

The keyword: Evolution. Organic growth and progression. And a football economic model that makes that actually possible.

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Happy for Ronaldo, and I support FC Barcelona.

Euro 2016 final, 25 minutes on, Ronaldo throws the captain’s armband on the turf, is down and ready to be subbed off!

He goes off on the stretcher and on comes Quaresma. 

Quaresma, a player over a decade ago was considered the h,o,p,e of the word hope for Portuguese football. When FC Barcelona scouted for the best youth to sign, they melted the wedding rings of all board members to pay the price of getting him (figuratively speaking).

From there, his career swung back to Portugal, another attempt by Inter, ended by a loan to Chelsea, off to turkey, then Dubai, packed back to Portugal before heading back to Turkey. Altogether, playing 486 games on (barely) club level and scoring 87 goals. On international level, he played 56 games scoring 8 goals.

The player Quaresma replaced in that final was a player who was exactly in the same position like Quaresma over a decade ago, yet with a lower natural flair.

Ronaldo reached that substitution moment after playing 673 club matches, scoring 487 goals added to 133 international games with 61 goals. Three EPL titles, a La liga title, three UEFA champions league titles added to a collection of other club titles here and there. Three Ballon d'Or, four Golden shoe and a bunch of other individual awards on every level.

The only relevant comparison that should actually inspire people and become the case to discuss is right there: Quaresma Vs C. Ronaldo.

That contrast is the best demonstration you can make for youth about the value of ambition, determination, hardworking and drive. The difference, you can see just there.

We are talking about a player who accepted nothing but perfection for his career. He dedicated his life to exceed the highest limitations of his potentials. He worked on daily bases to run faster, jump higher, shoot stronger, score more, and accepted nothing but to be the best. If you believe Messi is the best player ever, then how much credit should C. Ronaldo get for being so good that people compared him to Messi, in Messi’s era?

Unfortunately, social media and the more engaging football mediums created more polarization than enhanced realization. There is an irony that in such an open space we were still able to fold ourselves in tight cults. The windmill of ranting and counter-ranting keeps on spinning the dust all over the virtual battlefield that we can barely recognize what we are fighting or fighting for anymore.

Make no mistake, rivalry is the best thing ever to happen for sports. And as an FC Barcelona fan, you can be sure I will keep on setting up banters and knitting jokes about Real Madrid, and C. Ronaldo. But it should just be that: Barely a half serious rambles. Sometimes, like when a great player like Messi suffers an unfortunate situation and retire, or a brilliant player like C. Ronaldo achieves one of the milestones of his life, winning for Portugal, maybe we can have a pause there and just recognize how far they deserve the best they can get.

And again, stop getting too obsessed about current narrations of how Messi or C. Ronaldo will be labeled in history. When that history arrives, y'all will be dead! So why don't we get advantage of the current situations for some current gains? After all, the legacy game is out of our hands.

Quaresma has a teardrop tattoo placed underneath his eye, which signifies that the wearer has killed someone. Judging by earlier expectations, the only thing Quaresma killed was an exceptional career.

Not only it was easier for C. Ronaldo to do a Quaresma, it was easier for him to do a Ronaldinho. A talent enough to complete Some brilliant seasons, win a handful of titles and take enough cash to the bank. Then, get the party going!

If you have a child who considers football an obsession, which comparison will serve you better to inspire him/her to have a great future, a Messi Vs C. Ronaldo, or a C. Ronaldo Vs Quaresma?

I can tell you now, anyone who is willing to put half the level of hard work C. Ronaldo invested in his career, will make his parents proud no matter what career he walks through. 

So, Kudos for C. Ronaldo for winning Euro 2016, but more for setting such an example.

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Maradona, Messi and football legacy

Scene one: Copa America

It is telling that as soon as Messi lost the Copa America final, the Maradona Vs Messi legacy discussion kicked off to demonstrate that Messi is no where near Maradona. 

Our script of Maradona's legacy overlooks the fact that Maradona never even came close to compete for Copa America title, getting kicked out of the group stage in 1979, coming fourth when Argentina hosted the tournament in 1987, and forth in 1989. 

Worth noting as well that Pele came as close as third in the tournament with Brazil, and that was in 1959.

And that is fine and normal. Because we are basically comparing two different things here: What we know NOW about Messi (the news) to what we collectively narrate about Maradona: His legacy. Two completely different languages.

The legacy thingy

We get it all wrong when we start arguing about Messi's legacy as if it is up for us to live it, analyse it, and deliver the narration of it as a permanent historical script for the future.

As proven over and over again, time has its own dynamics, and life rewrites us as a past tense over and over again in many ways and different versions mixing our subjective views, future generations' approach, sentiments, and nostalgia in an outlined narration of what matters most for Them then, not for us now. 

So many details we are so obsessed about now regarding Messi will have no relevance in the future narration about Messi's legacy. Same as so many details about previous Greats (Oh, the details!) were left behind and ignored in order to trim, polish, and add a magical touch of aura - a main ingredient needed-  to the legacy iconic formula.

Reading through the refined legacies of past Greats and trying to pull it off that heavenly throne to its past reality will put their achievements in the right none-supernatural perspective and offer a chance to predict how Messi's legacy will look like after his achievements get the same level of maintenance and packaging over time. 

I should note that I am a life time Maradona fan, and putting Maradona's legacy on the table here is simply because he is the name used most in comparison with Messi, and because for me Maradona was always the greatest of them all (I didn't watch Pele matches), until Messi.

Scene two: Club legacy

There is no doubt that Maradona's era at Napoli was a blast. Not only for the titles Napoli won but as a part of the south vs north sociocultural background in Italy. However, the margin distancing the legendary legacy from the great reality is the issue we should spot a light on more. 

The club:

Starting with Napoli's position in the league table during and around the period Maradona played there (Maradona's seasons with Napoli are in brackets), from 1980-1981 season and on, Napoli's ranking swinged as the following: 

3rd, 4th, 10th, 12th, (8th, 3rd, 1st, 2nd, 2nd, 1st, 8th) , 4th, 11th, 6th...

The boost Napoli enjoyed during Maradona's time there is obvious, but a closer look at the sequence shows that Napoli was not exactly the Leicester City of Italy that Maradona carried on his back to title. If anything, Napoli was more the Liverpool or Spurs of Italy, an inconsistent team swinging between top but not enough in a good season, and dropping low in another. A team with a budget good enough, and a project exciting enough to afford getting a player like Maradona, and a club name known enough to tempt a player like Maradona to escape to after a not so impressive time at FC Barcelona.

Do I think adding Messi to Liverpool or Spurs make them competetive enough to win some titles? Yes.

Instead, Messi played for a club with a higher quality and achieved more on the club level. You cant take that against him.

We don't even need to draw comparisons between Napoli and the mentioned English clubs, falling in the trap of "No, its not the same" argument. Was Napoli the best title story in Italy during that era? "The club that snatched the title out of the gigantic italian clubs hands" like the legacy tells. No, not even that. 

The name of that club is: Hellas Verona.

Promoted from second division in 1981-1982 season, the following seasons for Verona went like this:

4th, 6th, 1st, 10th, 4th, 10th...

Verona finished their first season in Serie A in top four, and won the title two years later. Beating all the big clubs in Italy, without having a Maradona. 

That, added to the swining position of both Verona and Napoli in the league sheds a light on the state of the Italian league back then. It was a period where the competition was wide open for all teams to entertain their chances until the mid nineties when AC Milan had their best team in history and more or less dominated with Juventus the following cycle. We should not mix the two periods together, as the legacy narration tends to do. 

Here are the league winners during Maradona's time in Napoli:

Verona, Juventus, Napoli, Milan, Inter, Napoli, Sampdoria, Milan...

It was not exactly a closed title winners brotherhood of clubs that Maradona hacked. More, a tough competition where Maradona's brilliance added to Napoli's squad provided enough quality to compete in it.

Napoli's squad? What squad? Wasn't it all about Maradona?

Napoli finished each of the two title winning seasons as the second best team defensively, with the least number of conceded goals. Keeping 16 clean sheets in 30 games in1987, and 14 clean sheet in 34 games in 1990.

Maradona was capable of doing many miracles with the ball, defending was not one of them. Napoli had a group of players who ended up having hundreds of international caps, especially for Italy and Brazil. They were not no ones by any scale.

In 1987, Maradona finished the title winning season scoring 10 goals out of Napoli's 41 scored goals in the league. Of course, the argument is: You can't compare Messi's numbers to Maradona's. Different leagues. So I will not do so. That season, Virdis finished as a top goalscorer with 17 goals out of his teams 31, Vialli came second with 12 out of 37, Altobelli 11 out of 32, then Ramon Diaz 10/30, Maradona 10/41, and Aldo Serna 10/42.

In 1990's Napoli title, Maradona scored 16 goals out of 57 goals the team scored. Van Basten was the top scorer with 19/56, followed by Baggio 17/41, then Maradona 16/57, and Schillaci 15/16.

Assuming that all the goals Maradona didn't score for Napoli he assisted, you need more than no ones in the squad to score 31 goals in 1987, and 41 goals in 1990.

There were names that made history in that Napoli. In fact, the current MSN, BBC, etc... naming trend for forward Trios is not new. In 1990, Napoli had its catchy Ma-Gi-Ca trio in Maradona, Giordano, and Careca. The Careca who scored 73 goals in 164 games for Napoli, and 29 goals in 60 international games for Brazil.

Scene three: The worldcup

Maradona's adventure in world cup 1982 was so chaotic that Argentinians demanded to chop him off world cup's 1986 squad and replace him by Bochini, a supposedly better player. Then he lost world cup 1990 final (scoring no goals in the tournament) before blowing off the chance of Argentina's excellent squad in world cup 1994 after getting tested positive for five variants of ephedrine.

Its all about world cup 1986 then, where he had an amazing tournament and played the major role in Argentina's world cup win. But to suggest that Maradona single handed won the world cup while Messi failed, that's where legacy narration fails the reality check. 

Argentina 1986, as all critic from that era confirm, was a brilliant team defensively and had a perfectly organised and executed 3-5-2 system that caught everyone by surprise. They conceded an average of 0.71 goals per game in that tournament, which is even lower than Italy's 0.86 World cup 1982 winners.

At the same time, having a look at the goalscorers in the 7 games then, we find:

Maradona: 5 

Valdano: 4

Burruchaga 2

Ruggeri 1

Pasculli 1

Brown 1

Even in the final, the goal scorers of the three goals winning Argentina the title were Brown, Valdano and Burruchaga.

Fast forwarding to world cup 2014 (Where admittedly Messi was not at his best form after a complicated season) :

Messi: 4

Rojo 1

Di Maria 1

Higuain 1

Ibisevic, Bosnia and Herzegovina player (own goal) 1

Maradona had to score only a third of his team's goals in 1986, while Messi had to score half of it. A Bosnia and Herzegovina player scored as many goals for Argentina in 2014 as any other Argentinian scorer beside Messi.

This detail is not just about the numbers. It makes a big difference when the opponent feels the obligation to keep an eye on more than one player, rather than focusing on marking the only threat out of the game. It also improves the assists converted to goals, something Maradona teammates did, Messi's didn't.

Maradona's highest point in Worldcup 1986 was the game against England, where not only Maradona delivered an unmatched display in a world cup game, but also won a game for Argentina against a country that just defeated them in a war. It also helped his case that Argentina was craving for a hero to match their football rivals, Brazil, who had Pele.

Messi did wonders for over 10 years, but it's a missed chance by Higuain here or there that determines his greatness. Get out of here.

— Ramzi ⚽Ⓜ (@footballmood) June 27, 2016

Messi's Legacy

Maradona is a legend. And that's stating the obvious. His real value was extraordinary enough that WE embraced a legacy about him that almost purified his career. We trimmed off his flaws on the field and almost completely ignored everything else about Maradona that may scratch his statue. That's how the unique greats deserve to be treated.

Messi's legacy is fine. It is just pending till the right time. Talking about Messi's legacy already is another sign about his brilliance. Legacy building starts when a player career is over. 

Legacy building starts when the rivalry soften down, and the people witnessing the miracle grow some years to get back to it with a dosage of nostalgia, even if they were not FC Barcelona or Argentina fans. 

Legacy building starts when current generation concur with a new generation 20 years from now, having their own hero. And that's when we feel like claiming our bragging rights: "Hey, I lived a time where we watched Leo Messi games on weekly bases. Sit...down". 

Legacy building starts when new generations look at our current Greats with an eye craving for inspirational examples from the past, not rivalry bantering at the heat of a moment. When they stand in awe, watching that amazing force of nature demonstrating a peak football performance for the coming generations to look up to.

 

And then, there will be no space for lots of the noises and twitter rants. There will be no twitter in the first place. A legacy is all about the brilliant moments that defines it. And when it is brilliant enough, even the little falls can trigger more compassion than doubts, like Netherlands 1974, or Brazil 1982, and the same as coming generations will see when they look at FC Barcelona of the past decade. 

If a team or a player delivers enough brilliance to inspire the future, the future can be more forgiving and generously rewarding than what one can imagine. 

Future has no time for our detailed details as it has more past to write about, and more future to make. 

So, lets just enjoy what we have, and let the rest sort itself out. Messi videos will be there for generations to watch and appreciate. His legacy will not be denied.

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FC Barcelona or Real Madrid, who will win the Liga 2012?

Three celebrates, three think its too early

FC Barcelona and Real Madrid find no third in the Liga to bug their plans of winning the title. But by having each other, they can hardly wish for additional challenges. In fact, the big margin of quality separating the big two from the rest is one of the main reasons why the rivalry between the two clubs reached a do-or-die level. This is a league where a draw for any of the two teams can cause the collapse of the season. The chance of reversing the damage and balancing the books of points is very slim compared to other leagues in other countries.


However, there is one main difference this season that makes this league way more interesting. If you go back to last time Real Madrid won the title, you will notice that the strong fight they put till the end (in two seasons) came hand in hand with a catastrophic collapse for FC Barcelona on and off the field. Then you move forward to the seasons FC Barcelona won and you notice that even though Real Madrid had superb seasons, FC Barcelona were on a very high level and almost unbeatable. In my opinion, this is the first season where the two teams are playing on the same level – each utilizing own strength and suffering own weaknesses. While Barcelona is still the best team collectively and (for most positions) even if you compare individuals one-by-one in the starting eleven, Real Madrid squad provide more depth and diversity. The fact that both teams have their backs to the wall (No more: we are building a team for future) put more pressure and make the mental strength, squad moral, and club’s environment deciding factors, more than ever.

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What happened to FC Barcelona?

FC Barcelona, from a team winning six titles in one season to a team six points behind the Liga leaders this season, a free fall in the eyes of many observers. Some hot-blooded are calling doomsday, questioning the form of the players, their fitness, their commitment, or their spaghetti-making skills.

But what is really REALLY happening at FC Barcelona?

Nothing. Case closed. Thank you for reading this "insightful" post. 

Saying that nothing changed overnight, turning the best club in the world to an old half-dead horse, does not mean there are no "issues" to fix. It means that there are no NEW issues emerging or at least nothing of a great significance.

Word on the street is all about the flaws of Barcelona's system, and the need to apply changes and turn things around. Now those who were generous enough to read many of my previous posts in the past three years can tell, I am not the Shaolin temple of that system. No doubt, I am a dedicated apologist for the key concepts of Pep's method of play, but even during the most glorious, Lets-all-hail-greatness, periods I was the boring dude nitpicking flaws and demanding changes to perfect what is genetically great. Yet, strange enough, what the team need to do first is to go back to the basics of the current system BEFORE talking about any changes. Getting carried away by the praise targeting some of the main features of that system, led to forgetting what system is all about. In fact, every season this team is moving one step further from the system we witnessed during Pep's first year as a first team manager.

Season one:

The first team Pep stitched played -mainly- two offense structures: The first with an offense line of Messi-Eto'o-Henry supported by Yaya, Xavi, Iniesta. The second structure consisted of Messi-Eto'o-Iniesta supported by Yaya-Xavi-Keita in the midfield.

In the first structure, Barcelona controlled Possession thru midfield, but at the same time they had players in the offense line who love to play as close to the opponent box as possible. Henry and Eto'o contributed in the buildup through midfield just when they felt it was needed, BUT were never settled to that. One of the great changes Pep made was giving Henry the permission to act as a second striker when possible, beside his nominal function to run on the left flank to create width. Henry became much more lethal this way compared to Rijkaard's days where the french role was to hug the lines and play as a wing (Remember this point as we will come back to this later).

Henry and Eto'o always tried to demand the ball between defenders or behind them rather than shying away from the defenders to create redundant outlets in the midfield. Their physical characteristics offered them the requirements needed to hold on the ball while having a defender breathing at their necks, offering the chance for more dynamic outlets to move around the mesmerized defenders. By doing so, Henry and Eto'o served like board pins, clinching defenders to hold position, being more worried about how to contain the forwards than how to cover behind their defending midfielders.

In such selection, Barcelona had a midfield combination (and Messi, Alves, ..) capable of swallowing the opponent midfield in a black hole of possession and ball circulation, while the forwards were torturing the opponent defense line and pushing them to the edge. Such mechanism automatically creates more spaces between the opponent lines, something Messi and Co are capable to expose best. To visualize things a bit, get the ball to Messi between the lines and the defender will have to chose either to release Eto'o and intercept Messi (who will ultimately pass the ball to Eto'o through Xavi/Iniesta), or to stand by Eto'o and watch Messi slicing through the box like a shark.

When the offense of Messi, Eto'o, Iniesta was backed by Yaya, Xavi, Keita, Keita was the most advanced midfielder of the three adding more directness in offense to compensate Henry's absence while Iniesta's dual functionality as a LW/CM made the team perform as if they have 12 players in the selection. The importance of a level of directness in the selection was demonstrated during November-December period of Pep's first season (and I always refer back to that period for its significance). Iniesta was injured during that period and by having Keita in the midfield and Henry upfront, the team witnessed one of its most lethal periods scoring like freaks against the best teams in the Liga back then (and the competition was tighter there, for the record).


Season Two:

Eto'o was exchanged for Ibra, not only to add aerial threat but also for being more technical, and more capable of holding on the ball, beside his play-making qualities (Beside many other Eto'o/Pep/Ibra stuff, not so relevant to this post topic). Another very significant factor at the beginning of season two was the -predictable- collapse of Henry's form after winning the champions league. And so the club started the new season counting on an offense line of Pedro-Ibra-Messi.

Out of sudden, two players who were fond of playing close to the opponents' box were subbed by two players -added to Messi- all more ball-o-holic and like to play wherever the ball rambles. The whole offense line sank in the midfield, contributing in crawling the buildup carnival all the way to the offense third. The opponent players who check Barcelona forwards first became the midfielders while the actual defenders became more focused on creating depth and diagonal cover and to close popping up holes appearing here and there.

At the beginning of the season, Messi (by being Messi), and Ibra (by being Ibra) led the scoring sheet decent enough to keep things going, regardless of the systematic failure.  It was about individuals quality in a period still early to expect more chemistry from/with a new striker. Then it all turned chaos when Messi decided to play as a false nine and Ibra decided not to play anymore. There was enough room for mistakes in the Liga and so it was won, but not the Champions league.

Season Three:

When Barcelona signed Villa, I was very excited about the offense line of Villa-Ibra-Messi, and I wrote about that. Keep in mind we didn't know what was happening behind the curtains back then (I can't say I am certain I know now) .

Villa was never a choice for me as a center forward for Barcelona, and I still cant understand how some considered him so. He was an obvious choice for that Missing Henry role. Open to the flank, cut to the center, and score. With both Ibra and Messi being very interested in contributing in the buildup, Villa was the X-factor supposed to add more directness and scoring threat. But the offense line ended up being Pedro-Villa-Messi

We don't need to repeat ourselves, talking about the offense line sinking in the midfield. It needed a supernatural Messi to have an extraordinary season and carry the team on his back to win titles. What we need to note though, is that season three completed the transition of the initial system from being an attacking-based system structured on possession to become a possession-based system with attacking vibes.

Such transition meant that the possession quality became -by far- a higher priority than offense drive. Losing possession became more drastic from the system's perspective than missing a scoring opportunity. This situation put more pressure on the forwards to become less daring to take gambles. Eto'o and Henry used to lose the ball too often to even work in the system that Barcelona applies at the moment. But I bet they would've kept on doing few things their way. Only a player with enough courage (and ego) would dare to take responsibilities and try stuff from the high-risk-high-return shelf. Villa relegated from being the offense leader he was at Valencia to serve as a co-pilot to Messi, and as Pedro he felt more settled to play it safe and only go for the guaranteed decisions. Offense players are not supposed to avoid doing the wrong things, they are supposed to try doing the right things, regardless of all the risks involved.

Season four

In the summer post Protection, perfection, or excellence we analyzed the possibilities available to strengthen Barcelona's squad during the summer. Pep decided to go for the excellence option (or maybe the players available in the market made the decision for him), and Alexis was the fortunate player to join the group.

It is still too early to figure how far this alternative will work. Theoretically, I believe. Yet, if we learned anything in the past two years its that unpredictable football is way more unpredictable when it come to Barcelona. And there are specific requirements needed for this new adventure to sail in the right direction.

First thing first, "the system" need to be generous enough to accept more diversity. The players available since three years are the best possible to serve the religious practices demanded by the exciting holly system. No new monks can do this better. So if all what's needed is more of the same, buying any player is useless. Unless if "the system" agrees to stop chewing players and spitting them in the same one-flavor bowl, we can safely say this team has reached its ultimate potentials with no more room for any progress. Checked.

To demonstrate that, Alexis Sanchez is a player with sharp directness. Watch him at Udinese, and watch him when he plays for Chile. He receives the ball and first thing he does is to turn toward the opponent's keeper, giving him a dirty look and murmuring: "Here I come Bastad! You better run and hide before its too late!"

Well, most of the time, he doesn't really arrive to the destined station. But if every time a forward want to run over defenders he end up scoring, this sport will turn to a scoring Karaoke!  What we know is that despite all the misses, messes, and possession loss, he generated enough threat to become one of the best performers in South America and Serie A, and he proved good enough for Rosell to sell the club's printers, collecting enough money to buy this energizer Bunny.

Again, it is still far too early to know how this will work out. But there are some signs what left me wondering. Sanchez hesitation on the ball is something new for anyone who followed him enough. His unadventurous passes, bowing to his team's midfielders to take his leash. Lack of the daring spark he is characterized of, and -here you go- being too worried of losing possession in a one-on-one that he end up hesitating AND losing possession.

It is really normal for any new player to feel like an underdog and try to play it safe at the beginning till he finds his steps in the selection. I am by no means picking on him. But he HAS to take responsibilities even if there is a chance Messi will yell at him for not passing the ball. One of the main reasons why Messi is that brilliant is the fact that he takes risks and can afford to make mistakes and losing possession. Alexis is NOT Messi yet, but he should take a page from that book. Pep has a HUGE role here, and it is a role that exceeds providing enough guidance to Alexis but also to the rest of the selection. Take responsibilities. This is not going to work if the club ends up being FC Messi.

Talking about Pep, I believe Villa's role should be modified as well. Currently, he is playing the same role Henry played in Rijkaard's last season as a coach. I started to believe that the main tactical structure Pep wanted to apply this season was a 3-4-3, basically to find enough playing time for the Zillion and one midfielder he has in his squad. To do so, it was Villa's role to play as a wing for the head of midfield rhombus (Cesc/Thiago) to attack the center. This was not supposed to work, and it isn't - for many reasons. If the rhombus is a logistic need for squad rotation, play 4-4-2. Regardless of the fact that Pep should use the best selection to get results, not to satisfy players. This is coming from someone who demanded buying the players the club needs and not the players of the club need. But let's not go there...

If Pep is willing to play three defenders, then a 3-5-2 is the way to go as it utilizes the main qualities of each and every player while covering their weaknesses.

Players picked here were based on the available squad when this image was made

There is nothing catastrophic to talk about in this team. Each and every team in the world has its strengths and flaws. This is still the same team after Getafe's match and before it. On one side, this is a praise, but on the other side it is not the best position to be the same while everyone around you improves, or at least become more experienced in how to deal with you. Great performances will keep on coming and titles are certainties regardless of the frequency of winning them. The main challenge is that there is less room for mistakes, and Barcelona's football method is so sensitive to flaws that it requires perfect performance game in game out to expect consistent results. Is that fair? You already know my response... C'est la vie!

Football mood on Twitter: @FootballMood

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